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Abstract
We consider a queueing facility where customers decide when to ar-
rive. All customers have the same desired arrival time (w.l.o.g. time
zero). There is one server, and the service times are independent and
exponentially distributed. The total number of customers that de-
mand service is random, and follows the Poisson distribution. Each
customer wishes to minimize the sum of three costs: earliness, tardi-
ness and waiting. We assume that all three costs are linear with time
and are defined as follows. Earliness is the time between arrival and
time zero, if there is any. Tardiness is simply the time of entering ser-
vice, if it is after time zero. Waiting time is the time from arrival until
entering service. We focus on customers’ rational behaviour, assuming
that each customer wants to minimize his total cost, and in particular,
we seek a symmetric Nash equilibrium strategy. We show that such
a strategy is mixed, unless trivialities occur. We construct a set of
equations that its solution provides the symmetric Nash equilibrium.
The solution is a continuous distribution on the real line. We also
compare the socially optimal solution (that is, the one that minimizes
total cost across all customers) to the overall cost resulting from the
Nash equilibrium.
1 Introduction
In many real life situations, customers choose strategically when to arrive to
a queue. For example, when commuting to work in the morning, or going
to the cafeteria at lunch time, etc. In those kind of situations, customers
usually have a preferred arrival time, such as, commuting to work right after
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dropping the kids at school. For the sake of simplicity, we refer to the pre-
ferred arrival time as time 0 (w.l.o.g). In many cases, customers share the
same preferred arrival time. This is very likely to be the case in the morning
commute, or when going out for lunch. If all customers wish to arrive at that
time, it causes congestions. As a consequence, one would consider alter his
arrival time in order to avoid waiting for a long time. In this situation, from
an individual point of view, a trade-off between the arrival time preference
and the queue length is formed. This trade-off was studied widely in the lit-
erature (see [1], [4], [14], [16], and [20]). Whereas, in all of them the trade-off
was between waiting and tardiness costs. However, we suggest an additional
cost, that is also reflected in the dilemma of when to arrive, and it is referred
as earliness cost. This cost is induced by making the effort of arriving earlier
than desired. A classic example would be commuting to work at 4 AM just
to avoid traffic jams. In this example, clearly, arriving this early minimizes
the waiting time in one hand, but on the other, commuting so early is in-
convenient. We further discuss the motivation of adding earliness cost in the
next section.
In this study, we propose a model where customers choose when to ar-
rive. Each individual possess three types of costs: Earliness, tardiness and
waiting. Whereas, waiting refers to the amount of time one waited in the
queue. Earliness is related to the amount of time one arrived before time 0,
and if he arrived after time 0, then there is no earliness cost. Tardiness is
related to the amount of time entering service after time 0. However, if an
individual service time began prior to time 0, then there is no tardiness cost.
We focus on homogenous customers with respect to their costs and desired
service time. Under this assumption, customers make their arrival decision
while knowing that others have the same preferences. In such systems, all
customers’ decisions interact. That is, an individual’s cost is determined not
only by his own decision, but also by others’, and thus the natural model
of customers’ arrivals is a non-cooperative game. Motivated by this point
of view, we look for a symmetric Nash equilibrium. That is, if a (possibly)
mixed arrival strategy is used by all, an individual has no incentive to uni-
laterally deviate from it. This solution, which determines the arrival process
for the system, implies the opening and closing times of the system. We also
discuss a system with exogenous opening and closing times, and study the
impact of these constraints on customers’ behavior.
We found that in the case where there were no opening and closing time
constraints, the Nash equilibrium is mixed and unique, and has a positive
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density f(t) along the interval [−Te1 , Te2], with some Te1 , Te2 > 0. f(t) is
complete (that is, the CDF has no jumps) and continuous almost every-
where, with a connected support. In the case where the opening and closing
times are constrained, the equilibrium may be either pure or mixed, and if
the latter is the case, then it can also contain an atom.
In this paper we show how to compute the Nash equilibrium strategy for
all of the above-mentioned cases. The equilibrium strategy, in general, is not
socially optimal, in the sense that it doesn’t minimize the expected overall
costs of all the customers. This is because the decision of when to arrive,
taken by an individual, imposes additional losses on the others. The latter
are often referred to as externalities. Therefore, finding the socially optimal
solution is also of our interest. This allows us to compare the strategy that
holds for the Nash equilibrium and the one that minimizes the overall cost.
In order to compare the two, we derive their ratio, which is called the price
of anarchy (PoA). The value of the PoA can help us understand how much
customers can reduce their costs by cooperating with each other.
The analysis in the paper is performed for two types of environments.
The first is the familiar stochastic environment. In this case we assume that
the number of users is random and follows the Poisson distribution1 and the
service times are are exponentially distributed, independent and assumed to
be work conserving. The second environment is fluid-based, and each user
is associated with a drop of infinitesimal size. The stochastic model is more
accurate but can provide only numerical results (and not analytical). The
fluid model on the other hand can provide analytic results. Moreover, PoA
can be obtained as well. We make some observations regarding the relations
between the two models later on.
The paper is organized as follows : In Section 2 we describe the model
motivation and provide a literature review. In Section 3 we present the model
under study. In Section 4, we obtain the arrival equilibrium strategy for both
the stochastic model and the fluid model. In addition, we compare via the
fluid model the social cost of the equilibrium arrival strategy and the socially
optimal cost. In Section 5, we obtain the above solution concepts for the
constrained model. Finally, in Section 6 we summarize our main results.
1One can think of a huge amount of potential users, each one participate with a sig-
nificantly small probability. The Poisson approximation of the binomial distribution leads
to our assumption (see more in [4])
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2 Motivation and literature review
We next provide a motivation for the model under study. More specifically,
we explain why adding earliness cost to our model is important. This is
followed by a literature review.
2.1 Motivation
In the previous section, we introduced the concept of earliness cost. Whereas,
earliness cost induced by making the effort of arriving earlier than desired.
We next specify why we think it is vital to include it in the model. For this
purpose, we consider the morning commute example. When commuting, it is
very natural having a preferred arrival time. For the sake of demonstration,
we consider an employee, that doesn’t want to wake up too early for work in
one hand, but on the other hand, doesn’t want to arrive too late, when there
are important meetings to attend. For this particular example, we set the
desired arrival time to be 08:00 AM. The problem is, arriving at 08:00 comes
with heavy traffic. As a consequence, each arrival point, is costly, due to the
different cost types. In fact, each point comes with an aggregation of the
three cost types. For illustration, we consider a few arrival epochs. Arriving
between 05:30 to 06:30 AM induces an expected high earliness cost, low
waiting cost and no tardiness cost at all, since heavy traffic is not expected
and there is no reason to be late in this case. Arriving between 07:30 to
08:30 AM induces a high waiting cost due to heavy traffic, and relatively low
earliness and tardiness costs. Whereby, arriving between 10:30 to 11:30 AM,
induces an expected high tardiness cost, no earliness cost since no effort to
arrive earlier was made, and probably low expected waiting cost as the traffic
is probably flowing normally at that point.
The main idea is that when one needs to decide when to arrive, there are
three type distinctive types of costs to consider. Moreover, they all should
be under consideration simultaneously, as they are all time-dependant. To
the best of our knowledge, we are the first to identify this additional cost
(i.e. earliness) under a game theoretic environment2. We further suggest,
that even in the proposed cafeteria problem in [14], [15] and [16], one can
also consider earliness cost. It is assumed in those studies that customers
want to arrive to eat lunch when the cafeteria opens. But, it’s very likely
2Vickrey, already in 1969, considered the earliness concept in [22], but not as a game.
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that customers don’t arrive early to the cafeteria since it is not convenient
for them (e.g. not hungry yet) and not because it is not open, as in many
cases, they are open all day long. This inconvenience induces earliness cost
and it should be distinctive to other two cost types, waiting or tardiness.
Further examples which describe the proposed arrival dilemma are, going to
the supermarket, the gym and to the playground with the kids. Those places
are open most of the time, but less crowded in the beginning or the end of
the day, when it is less convenient to arrive.
The earliness cost can be interpreted in two ways. The first one is simply
arriving too early, for example, by waking up at the break of dawn just to
avoid traffic jams. The second is entering or completing service earlier than
desired, for example, arriving really early to a concert in order to get good
seats. However, in this study, we focus on the first option, where it does seem
more natural in many scenarios of strategic arrivals. We take for example
the morning commute dilemma. If one made the effort and arrived earlier
than he originally planned, he really has no incentive to stay longer on the
roads just to arrive to work at his desired time. That is, he is clearly better
off arriving earlier to work rather than being stuck in traffic. However, the
second option suggest that he might prefer waiting over arriving earlier to
work, where obviously it is not the case3.
2.2 Literature review
Similar queueing problems, in which customers need to decide when to ar-
rive, have been introduced in recent studies. The first such study was by
Glazer and Hassin [3], and they considered a model where service has an
opening time point, which is set to be time 0 (w.l.o.g). However, customers
are allowed to arrive before time 0, thereby being referred to as early birds.
In order to be served, customers must arrive prior to a predetermined closing
time, which is denoted by T and assumed to be positive. Similar to our
model the total number of arrivals comes from a Poisson distribution. All
customers wish to minimize their waiting time in the queue. In that study
it was shown that there is a unique, mixed Nash equilibrium in the interval
(−w, T ) for some w > 0. It is also shown that the arrival distribution in the
interval [−w, 0] is uniform, and with a positive density distribution f(t) along
(0, T ]. The authors showed that the expected waiting time for arriving any
3We refer the reader to [21] for a model with the second option.
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time within the arrival support is w. This is because the expected waiting
time is constant along the support and the queueing time of a customer who
arrives at time −w is exactly w, since he is guaranteed to encounter an empty
queue. A subsequent study by Hassin and Kleiner [12] presented the same
model, only with an additional restriction: arriving at t < 0 is forbidden.
They showed that unless the system is heavily loaded, the restriction does
not change the average waiting time in a significant way. They also compared
the equilibrium solution to the socially optimal solution using fluid models.
They found that the ratio between them increases when the system becomes
more heavily loaded. Another important aspect of this study was gaining
a lower equilibrium social cost, while restricting the arrival times to two or
three discrete points.
Until this point, only the waiting cost was considered. Juneja and Jain
[16] introduced the concept of tardiness cost, which is added to the waiting
cost in their model. Their model was inspired by a situation where customers
decide when to arrive to a concert or a cafeteria. Each individual’s goal is to
arrive at the time t that minimizes the expression E[αW (t) + β(t +W (t))],
where, α and β were set to be the linear waiting and tardiness costs per time
unit respectively, t is the arrival time and W is the waiting time. Using fluid
models, the resulting equilibrium was shown to be a uniform arrival distri-
bution in the interval [τ0, τ1] for some τ0 < 0 and τ1 > 0. They also showed
that the PoA is 2. This model differs from ours in two things. The first is
that it doesn’t consider tardiness cost and the second that they consider a
constant number of arrival, as opposed to our model where it comes from a
Poisson distribution. A subsequent and more general study was published by
Haviv [4]. As in [16], this study recognizes tardiness cost as well as waiting
cost. However, the generalization of Haviv’s study is due to including both
the case where early birds are allowed and the case where they are not. In
order to get service, customers are obliged to arrive prior to a predetermined
time T > 0 (T = ∞ is possible). If early birds are allowed, the obtained
mixed equilibrium is a positive almost continuous arrival probability density
function along the interval (−w, Te) for some w > 0 and Te > 0, if Te < T .
The arrival distribution is uniform for the interval (−w, 0). If early birds are
not allowed, the result is an atom of a size denoted by p at zero, an interval
(0, t′) with a zero density, and some positive density f(t) along [t′, Te] for
some Te < T , or a pure equilibrium at time 0. However, when Te > T this
means that the pre-imposed closing time will affect the system. Of course
this will affect the solution, and now the upper limit of the arrival distri-
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bution support Te is replaced by T . This model is almost identical to ours
except we also consider earliness cost.
As mentioned, Juneja and Jain based their study on the concert/cafeteria
problem. Other studies concerning this problem include [14] and [15], where
the number of arrivals is finite and non-random, and one by Honnappa and
Jain [13] which considered a multiple-server model in which customers’ de-
cision is to choose a server. Another similar model was used in [20], which
considered a model including waiting time along with penalties by index of
arrival, and characterized the arrival process, which constitutes a symmetric
Nash equilibrium.
Another study which include both waiting and tardiness cost was done by
Breinbjerg [1]. In this study as opposed to the previous ones, nonlinear cost
functions were considered and the service distribution is general. By using a
novel approach he showed that there exists a unique symmetric Nash equi-
librium along numerical examples. Beside the theoretical studies, there are
several papers which includes empirical research. This allows to examine the
accuracy of analytical equilibrium solution. Strategic queuing models with
discrete arrival instances and deterministic service durations, the theoreti-
cal predictions were compared to empirical finding in controlled laboratory
experiments, which provide support for the symmetric mixed-strategy equi-
librium solution on the aggregate level (although not on the individual level),
see ([2], [17], [18] and [19]).
More related work was done by McAfee and McMillan [10], and Haviv
and Milchtaich [7]. Their contribution is in games, particularly in auctions
with a random number of players. Haviv, Kerner and Kella [8] described a
related study as well, in which there is a Poisson stream of customers to an
M/M/N/N loss system. Platz and Østerdal [11] studied a class of queue-
ing games with a continuum of players and no possibility of queueing before
opening time, and show that the first-in-first-out discipline induces the worst
Nash equilibrium in terms of equilibrium welfare, while the last-in-first-out
queue discipline induces the best. Another related set of papers concerns
transportation. Vickrey [22] presented a deterministic model where com-
muters have full information about other commuters, and are able to change
their arrival times in order to avoid heavy traffic. The model assumes a single
bottleneck and a constant number of participants. Delay occurs only when
the traffic flow exceeds the capacity of the bottleneck. Each commuter has
a preferred time to pass the bottleneck. Just as in our model, there is a cost
for arriving earlier than desired, and a tardiness cost. Later studies were
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published by Lago and Daganzo [6], Arnott [5], Ostubo and Rapoport [9],
and their bibliographies.
3 The models
In this section we present the details, including cost functions, of both the
stochastic and the fluid models.
3.1 The stochastic model
We consider a single-server queue in which customers decide when to arrive.
The service times, X1, X2, ..., are independent and exponentially distributed
with parameter µ and assumed to be work conserving. The server is active
between predetermined opening and closing times, denoted by −T1 and T2
respectively, where T1, T2 ∈ (0,∞]. The total number of customers, follows a
Poisson distribution with mean λ. Each customer wishes to minimize three
types of costs: earliness, tardiness and waiting. Earliness is the amount of
time from arrival till 0, and is applicable only if the arrival time is before
time 0. Tardiness is the amount of time after time zero that a customer
enters service. Waiting is the time that a customer spends in the queue. All
costs are linear in time, with slopes β1, β2 and α, for earliness, tardiness
and waiting, respectively. To summarize, the total cost for a customer who
arrives at time t1 and enters service at time t2 is
Cost (t1, t2) =


−β1t1 + α(−t1 + t2), t1 < t2 ≤ 0,
−β1t1 + α(−t1 + t2) + β2t2, t1 ≤ 0 < t2,
α(−t1 + t2) + β2t2, 0 < t1 < t2.
Of course, the best thing for a customer would be to arrive at time 0 and
encounter an empty system. That way, there will be no cost at all. We
assume that the decision is taken prior to observing the state of the queue.
Therefore, while making a decision, the only known variables are the arrival
time, and the marginal expected waiting and tardiness times. Let w(t) and
C(t) be the expected waiting time and the expected total cost, respectively,
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of a customer who arrives at time t. We have
C(t) =


−tβ1 + αw(t) + β2E
([
N(t)∑
i=1
Xi + t
]+)
, t < 0,
(α+ β2)w(t) + β2t, t ≥ 0.
(1)
where N(t) is the number of customers in the system at time t. In Lemma 1
we present E
([
N(t)∑
i=1
Xi + t
]+)
in terms of the model parameters.
Lemma 1.
E



N(t)∑
i=1
Xi + t


+
 = ∞∑
j=0
pj(t)
∫ ∞
s=0
j−1∑
k=0
1
k!
e−µ(s−t)(µ(s− t))kds, (2)
where pj(t) = P (N(t) = j) is the probability of having j customers at time t.
Proof.
E



N(t)∑
i=1
Xi + t


+
 = ∞∑
j=1
pj(t)E

[ j∑
i=1
Xi + t
]+
=
∞∑
j=1
pj(t)
∫ ∞
s=0
P

[ j∑
i=1
Xi + t
]+
> s

 ds
=
∞∑
j=1
pj(t)
∫ ∞
s=0
j−1∑
k=0
1
k!
e−µ(s−t)(µ(s− t))kds.
Remark 3.1. The cost functions for t < 0 and t > 0 differ in two aspects.
The first one is that an individual who arrives at t < 0 needs to consider all
three possible types of costs. However, an individual who arrives at t > 0
avoids any earliness cost, and hence must consider only two types of costs.
The second difference relates to the tardiness cost. For those who arrived
after time 0, the tardiness time is simply the expected waiting time plus the
tardiness time upon arrival. This is opposed to the case for those who arrive
at t < 0, where we need to consider the fact that there may not be a tardiness
cost.
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3.2 The fluid model
In the fluid model each customer is considered as a tiny drop, where each
drop is served in zero time. As opposed to the regular stochastic model, here
we assume a constant volume of drops, which is denoted by Λ. The server
serves µ of them in each time unit. If the total volume in the queue upon
arrival is η, then the waiting time will be exactly η
µ
. The earliness, tardiness
and waiting parameters, β1, β2 and α, are as above. We denote by F (t)
the proportion of drops that arrived prior to time t. Fluid models are less
realistic but can occasionally provide a good approximation to the stochastic
model. They fit better in cases where both the arrival volume and the service
rate are high, and no randomness in service is involved. They allows us to
give an explicit and simple formula for the Nash equilibrium and the socially
optimal strategies, which makes computing the PoA possible.
4 The case without opening and closing time
constraints
In this section we present our analysis of the unconstrained models, i.e.,
T1 =∞, and T2 =∞, for both the stochastic and the fluid models.
4.1 Stochastic model
In this section we obtain the symmetric Nash equilibrium arrival strategy.
We show that it is a continuous distribution with a support that is a con-
nected interval, (−Te1 , Te2), with Te1 , Te2 ≥ 0. We observe that f(t), the
density function associated with the Nash equilibrium strategy, is continu-
ous everywhere except at the opening point −Te2 , and at time 0. When we
study the properties of the distribution that represents a symmetric Nash
equilibrium, we observe that it cannot contain an atom. This is because, if
there were an atom and a customer arrived an infinitesimally small moment
earlier, he would achieve an atomic gain by paying an infinitesimal cost. We
prove the above-mentioned properties in Lemmas 2 and 3.
Lemma 2. In the unconstrained model, the mixed equilibrium strategy comes
with an almost everywhere continuous density function, and has connected
support (that is, there are no gaps in the arrival distribution).
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Proof. Our proof is based on a contradiction argument. That is, we assume
the existence of a gap and then show that the individual benefits from de-
viating, and prefers not to adopt the same strategy that all the others do.
We treat two mutually exclusive cases separately. These two cases are 1)
the gap interval is either to the left of time 0 or contains time 0, and 2) the
gap interval is to the right of time 0. The proof for case 2 (the entire gap
is positive) appears precisely in [4]. Thus, we provide here a proof for the
first case only. Let τ0 and τ1 be the lower and upper bounds of the gap,
respectively, with τ0 < 0. We now examine what the individual can gain if
he postpones his arrival by a small ∆. By doing so, he reduces his earliness
cost by ∆β1, and his waiting cost by α(1−p0(τ0))∆+o(∆), and as long as he
arrives before time 0 his tardiness cost remains the same. Thus, we eliminate
gaps with a lower bound that is smaller than 0. This means that case 1 is
not possible.
We observe that, for any arrival time within the equilibrium support, the
expected cost is β1Te1 . This is because, if the first customer to arrive comes
at time −Te1 , he will clearly pay only an earliness cost. Hence, his cost is
β1Te1 and therefore his expected cost too. Combined with the fact that the
cost function is constant for every value of t along (−Te1 , Te2), this will be
the expected cost for all customers at equilibrium regardless of when they
arrived. So far, we have given general properties of the arrival distribution,
f(t). However, f(t) is yet to be obtained. Since an analytic expression for
obtaining f(t) is implicit, we focus on how to compute it numerically. We
next present a set of conditions which are satisfied uniquely by Te1, Te2 and
f(t). Then, we describe a numerical procedure that computes them. First,
due to the lack of atoms, ∫ Te2
t=−Te1
f(t)dt = 1. (3)
Second, due to the fact that C(t) is constant along [−Te1 , Te2], and hence the
derivative is zero, we have
−β1 + αw′(t) + β2

E

N(t)∑
i=1
Xi + t


+

′
= 0, −Te1 ≤ t < 0, (4)
(α + β2)w
′(t) + β2 = 0, 0 < t ≤ Te2 . (5)
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By standard arguments from dynamics in queueing processes we get that
w′(t) =
λf(t)− µ(1− p0(t))
µ
, 0 ≤ t ≤ Te2. (6)
Similar to [4], by combining (5) and (6), we conclude that
f(t) =
(1− p0(t))µ
λ
− β2µ
(α + β2)λ
, 0 ≤ t ≤ Te2 . (7)
By the forward Kolomogorov equations, we also have
p′0(t) = p1(t)µ− p0(t)λf(t), −Te1 ≤ t ≤ Te2 . (8)
and for k ≥ 1
p′k(t) = −pk(t)(µ+ λf(t)) + pk−1(t)λf(t) + pk+1(t)µ, −Te1 ≤ t ≤ Te2 . (9)
We next identify the behavior of the system at the latest arrival time (under
Nash equilibrium). From [4] (Lemma 2.2), we also have that in the uncon-
strained model:
f(Te2) = 0 or, equivalently, p0(Te2) =
α
α + β2
. (10)
This result will be useful in the numeric procedure.
Remark 4.1. After deriving all the conditions above we can use a numerical
procedure to find the equilibrium strategy. For practical reasons, we limit
ourselves to a maximum number of possible arrivals, denoted by Nmax, such
that
Nmax = sup{n ∈ N : P(N > n) ≤ 10−2}.
The corresponding forward Kolomogorov equation is
p′Nmax(t) = −pNmax(t)µ+ pNmax−1(t)λf(t), −Te1 ≤ t ≤ Te2 . (11)
At equilibrium, customers are starting to arrive at time −Te1, and therefore
the initial conditions will be
p0(−Te1) = 1, pk(−Te1) = 0, ∀k ∈ {1, 2, ..., Nmax}.
Before we give the guidelines that describe the numerical procedure, we note
that we don’t have a closed-form expression for f(t) where t < 0. Therefore,
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we extract it from the Eqs. (4), (8), (9) and (11). The numerical procedure is
as follows. We first guess a value for −Te1. Then, while using the dynamics
in (8), (9) and (11), coupled with the equation we extracted for f(t) for
t < 0, we compute f(t) and pk(t) for any k ∈ {0, 1, ..., Nmax} from t = −Te1
until t = 0. Then we do the same for t > 0, only now for computing f(t)
we use Eq. (7) instead. Stop when one of the conditions (3) or (10) are
met. If the stopping criterion was based on condition (3) then we guess a
smaller value of Te1, otherwise we guess a larger one. This goes on until
conditions (3) and (10) are met simultaneously, while allowing an error of
ǫ < 10−2, that is, the convergence error of the integral of f(t) is no larger
than ǫ (see Fig. 1). Finally, we note that a bisection procedure is required for
finding −Te1.
Lemma 3. In the unconstrained model, the equilibrium arrival strategy has
a positive density function, f(t), which is a continuous function except at the
points t = −Te1 and t = 0.
Proof. We commence with the point t = −Te1 . According to the equilibrium
arrival strategy, customers are starting to arrive at t = −Te1 , which means
that f(−T−e1) = 0. We next show that f(−T+e1) 6= 0, and by that we prove
discontinuity at −Te1 . Due to the fact that the system is empty until time
−Te1 , using (8) we have f(−T+e1) = −
p′0(−T
+
e1
)
λ
. Since customers are starting
to arrive at time −Te1 , the probability of zero customers in the system is
decreasing and hence p′0(−T+e1) < 0; therefore f(−T+e1) > 0 as well. The
next discontinuity point is at t = 0. From (6) one can see that if w′(t)
has a discontinuous point at t = 0, then f(t) will have the same. This is
because only f(t) can be discontinuous in the equation. From (4) we get
w′(t) =
β1−β2

E
(
N(t)∑
i=1
Xi+t
)+
′
α
, and specifically for t = 0− we assert that
limt→0 E
(
N(t)∑
i=1
Xi + t
)+
= w(0−), and hence
w′(0−) =
β1
α + β2
,
and from (5) we get w′(t) = −β2
β2+α
and specifically, for t = 0+:
w′(0+) =
−β2
α + β2
.
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Thus, w′(0−) 6= w′(0+), which according to (6) means that f(t) has a discon-
tinuity at t = 0.
Theorem 1. In the unconstrained model, a unique equilibrium arrival strat-
egy with a positive density f(t) along the interval (−Te1 , Te2) will be formed.
f(t), Te1 and Te2 obey Eqs. (3) to (10), where Te1 > 0 and Te2 > 0. f(t) is
continuous except at t = 0.
Before proving the theorem we provide the following lemma and the def-
initions. Let there be two different arrival strategies with the cumulative
arrival distribution F1(·) and F2(·) and let w1 and w2 be the lower bounds of
the arrival support of F1 and F2 respectively, where w1 > w2. Also, let N1(·)
and N2(·) be the number of customers in the system according to F1 and F2
respectively. Finally, let t0 be the lowest value in which F1(·) and F2(·) meet.
Formally, t0 = inf{t|F1(t) = F2(t), t > w}.
Lemma 4. The expected cost of arriving at t0 under F2 is lower than arriving
under F1.
Proof. We first state that the difference of the two expected costs can be
only via the workload since they arrived at the same time. By employing
a coupling argument, we claim that N2(t0) ≤st N1(t0). This is because the
arrivals prior to t0 according to F2 occurred earlier than those according to
F1. Hence, according to F2, service completions occurred no later than those
according to F1. Consequently the workload under F2 is smaller and by that
we complete the proof.
We next prove Theorem 1.
Proof. We need to prove that the equilibrium is unique, since everything
else has already been argued. Recall that by setting a starting arrival point
at equilibrium, −Te1 , and due to the a constant cost function (under equi-
librium), a unique f(t) results. Furthermore, f(t) and −Te1 determine the
value of Te2 uniquely. Aiming for a contradiction we assume an alterna-
tive equilibrium strategy in which customers are arriving along the support
(−T ′e1 , T ′e2) where, −T ′e1 < −Te1 (w.l.o.g.). We note that the expected costs of
the original and alternative equilibria are β1Te1 and β1T
′
e1
respectively, with
β1Te1 < β1T
′
e1
. From Lemma 4, we get that there exist a point t0 in which
the expected cost under the alternative strategy is lower than arriving under
the original strategy since −T ′e1 < −Te1 . Since under mixed equilibrium the
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cost is constant, the fact that the orders between the costs at opening and
at t0 are reversed, rules out the existence of two equilibria.
4.2 Fluid model
Let’s consider the first drop to arrive. Clearly, it will not be after time
0. Moreover, this drop will be served immediately. This means that only
earliness and waiting costs are under consideration. As time goes by and a
workload accumulates, there will be a point in time at which a drop that
arrived prior to time 0 will enter service after time 0. Hence, all types of cost
are under consideration. Once drops start to arrive after time 0, they avoid
earliness cost. Consequently, there are three different time intervals with
different cost function structures, and hence the mixed equilibrium arrival
strategy includes three different formulas for the density. Our notation for
Te1 and Te2 remains the same as for the stochastic model.
Theorem 2. In the unconstrained model, the unique equilibrium density is
a stepwise function with three steps.
f(t) =


α+β1
α
µ
Λ
, − β2Λ
(β1+β2)µ
≤ t ≤ − β1
α+β1
β2Λ
(β1+β2)µ
,
α+β1
α+β2
µ
Λ
, − β1
α+β1
β2Λ
(β1+β2)µ
≤ t ≤ 0,
α
α+β2
µ
Λ
, 0 ≤ t ≤ β1Λ
(β1+β2)µ
.
The corresponding social cost is
β1β2Λ
2
(β1 + β2)µ
.
Proof. Since we seek for a symmetric Nash equilibrium, the cost function is
constant along the support of the arrival distribution, and hence the deriva-
tive is zero. In the first part, only earliness and waiting costs are considered
until a point in time at which arrivals are being served after time 0. In the
second part, all three costs are taken into account. This means that a drop
that arrives at the queue at t < 0 will exit at t > 0. The third part contains
both waiting and tardiness costs. In summary, we have three different parts
with three cost functions, and hence three different arrival densities. Let
[−Te1 , t1] be the first part’s arrival density period, where t1 < 0 is the time
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point after which arrivals will pay a tardiness cost. The cost function of this
part is
C1(t) =
ΛF (t)− µ(t+ Te1)
µ
α− β1t, t ∈ [−Te1 , t1].
After taking the derivative and comparing to zero we will get the result as
stated above. We can reason in the same spirit about the second and third
parts, where the cost functions are
C2(t) =
ΛF (t)− µ(t+ Te1)
µ
α−β1t+β2
(
ΛF (t)− µ(t+ Te1)
µ
+ t
)
, t ∈ [t1, 0].
and
C3(t) = β2t+ (β2 + α)
(
ΛF (t)− µ(t+ Te1)
µ
)
, t ∈ [0, Te2 ]
respectively. The values of Te1 , t1 and Te2 are the solution of the following set
of equations: β1Te1 = β2Te2 ,
ΛF (t1)−µ(t1+Te1 )
µ
= −t1 and (t1 + Te1)(α+β1α µΛ) +
Te1β1
α+β1
(α+β1
α+β2
µ
Λ
) + Te2
α
α+β2
µ
Λ
= 1. The first equation arises due to the constant
cost for all arriving drops. Therefore, the first drop to arrive and the last
will have the same cost. The second equation shows that a drop arriving at
t1 will exit the system at time 0. Finally, the third equation sums the pdf to
1. The corresponding social cost is simply Λ times the overall cost of each
drop.
We next present the socially optimal strategy and its overall cost.
Theorem 3. The unique socially optimal strategy has a uniform density of
µ
Λ
along [− β2Λ
(β1+β2)µ
, β1Λ
(β1+β2)µ
]. The corresponding social cost is
β1β2Λ
2
(β1 + β2)2µ
. (12)
Proof. The socially optimal arrival rate is uniform with rate µ in order to
avoid waiting cost. The values of the lower and upper bounds of the arrival
(which we denote by LB and UB respectively) are the ones that minimize
the social welfare cost function, where clearly
LB,UB ≥ 0:
−
∫ 0
−LB
β1µtdt+
∫ UB
0
β2µtdt. (13)
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In addition, in order to ensure that the total volume is Λ, the condition
(LB + UB)µ = Λ should be met. Now obtaining the values of LB and UB is
straightforward. Finally, the social welfare results directly from (13).
The PoA is a direct result of dividing (12) by (13). In the unconstrained
model it equals exactly 2.
Remark 4.2. In the arrival density at equilibrium the first step is larger
than the second step, and the third is smaller than the second.
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Figure 1: Numerical example: the equilibrium arrival distribution in the
unconstrained model, for three different set values of β1, β2 and α.
5 The case with opening and closing time
constraints
In this section we present our analysis of the constrained models, i.e., where
T1 <∞ and T2 <∞, for both the stochastic and the fluid models.
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5.1 Stochastic model
In this subsection we study the effect of arrival time constraints on the equi-
librium arrival strategy. Due to the complexity of the case where both of the
constraints are effecting customers behaviour, we first discuss the case where
only the closing time is constrained (i.e., T1 = ∞, T2 < ∞), then the case
where only the opening time is constrained (i.e., T1 <∞, T2 =∞). Finally,
consider both of them simultaneously.
5.1.1 Constrained closing time:
While studying the effect of constraining the closing time, we first observe
that if the unconstrained equilibrium meets the constraint (i.e., T2 > Te2),
then the constraint has no effect on the customers’ behaviour. Thus, we deal
here only with the opposite case, T2 < Te2 . As before, the equilibrium arrival
strategy is a mixed strategy along an interval (−T ′e1 , T2) with a complete
density f(t) (that is, without any atoms). The lower bound of the support of
f(·), T ′e1 , is a part of the solution and needs to be found. We follow the same
line of analysis as in Theorem 1, but with two adjustments. The first one is
that Te2 from Eq. (3) is replaced by T2 and the second is that Eq. (10) no
longer holds. Actually, it is no longer in use because the closing time is not
exogenous. Notice that if T1 is finite but not effective (i.e., T
′
e1
< T1), then
our results remain the same. We give further details and prove our results
in Theorem 4.
5.1.2 Constrained opening time:
While studying the effect of constraining the opening time, we first observe,
just like the case above, that if the unconstrained equilibrium meets the
constraint (i.e., T1 > Te1), then the constraint has no effect on the customers’
behaviour. Thus, we deal here only with the opposite case, T1 < Te1 . The
structure of the equilibrium distribution in this case is significantly different
to those we have seen before. The difference is that a complete density
starting at time −T1 cannot be an equilibrium arrival strategy. Instead,
the structure of the equilibrium is either one in which all customers arrive
at time −T1, or else there is an atom of size p < 1 at time −T1, followed
by a gap, and then a positive density. For further analysis, we give the
following definitions. Let Np be a random variable that follows a Poisson
distribution with parameter λp. Let g1(t, p) be the expected overall cost of
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arriving at time t > −T1, given that Np arrives at −T1 and no-one else arrives
in the interval (−T1, t). Let g2(p), be the expected overall cost of arriving
at −T1 among Np more customers. If everyone arrives at −T1, arriving a
moment later is clearly not beneficial. Moreover, arriving at any time t < 0
is suboptimal, since the longer a customer waits, approaching time 0, his
expected earliness and waiting costs both reduce, while his tardiness cost
remains the same. Therefore, the best response to everyone else arriving at
−T1 is either arriving at −T1 as well, or at some t ≥ 0. Let t∗ be the best
response, besides −T1; then t∗ = argmint≥0 g1(t, 1). If g1(t∗, 1) > g2(1) then
there is a pure equilibrium at time −T1. That is, even the optimal arrival
point besides arriving with everyone else at −T1 is more expensive than
simply arriving at −T1 as well. However, if g1(t∗, 1) < g2(1), the equilibrium
arrival strategy is mixed, and incorporates an atom at time −T1, followed
by a gap, and then a positive density. Now, if arriving at t∗ is better than
arriving with everyone else at −T1 it can no longer hold for symmetric Nash
equilibrium. Consequently, an atom which is smaller than 1 is created at
−T1, and only after a while customers will arrive again. That is, there exists
an atom size p′ such that g1(t, p
′) = g2(p
′) for some t > 0. We denote the
upper bound of the arrival support as T ′e2 and distinguish it from the notation
of the upper bound when there was no effective opening time constraint Te2 .
We give further details and prove our results in Theorem 4.
5.1.3 Both opening and closing times are constrained:
To this end, we have discussed cases in which only one of the time constraints
is effective. We next address the cases where both of them are. We split
into two cases in order to simplify. First, let us consider the case where
T2 < Te2 and T1 < T
′
e1
. One can look at this scenario as if only the closing
time is constrained (while ignoring the opening time constraint), and when
computing the arrival strategy it resulted in a new initial arrival point T ′e1 .
However, if T1 < T
′
e1
the solution in no longer valid. Clearly, the equilibrium
arrival strategy can no longer involve a complete density at time −T ′e1 . In
fact, an atom at time −T1 is guaranteed. Furthermore, a pure equilibrium
strategy is possible. Now, let us explore a second case in which T1 < Te1
and we relate to T2 later. That is, we ignore the closing time constraint for
the time being. If g1(t
∗, 1) > g2(1), then a pure strategy is formed regardless
to T2. If g1(t
∗, 1) < g2(1), we define the following: Let T
′ be the smallest t
that satisfies g1(t, 1) = g2(1). Suppose now that T
′ > T2, this means that a
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pure strategy is formed again (where now, T2 is effective). But, if T
′ < T2,
then, this means that there is an arrival time that is better than arriving
at −T1 with everyone else. In this case, customers will start arriving from
T ′ until T ′e2 if there was no effective closing time constrained. However, if
T2 < T
′
e2
, then there will be an atom which is smaller than 1 at −T1 and
then customers arrive from T ′ until T2. We summarize our results for all of
the various cases in the following theorem. We present them by dividing the
possible cases into three different types of equilibrium arrival strategies: 1)
pure, 2) mixed with an atom, and 3) mixed without atoms.
Theorem 4. One of the following exhaustive and mutually exclusive cases
occurs.
Case 1: The equilibrium strategy is pure and it prescribes arriving at −T1 if
g2(1) < g1(t
∗, 1) or T2 < T
′ and g1(t
∗, 1) < g2(1).
Case 2: A mixed equilibrium which incorporates an atom with size p′ at
t=−T1, then an interval (−T1, t′) with zero density, followed by a positive
density from t = t′ until (T ′e2∧T2). This will be formed if one of the following
two conditions occurs:
i. Te1 < T1 < T
′
e1
and T ′ < T2 < Te2, or
ii. T1 < Te1 and T2 > T
′. The following conditions need to be obeyed.
g1(t
′, p′) = g2(p
′). (14)
∫ (T ′e2∧T2)
t=t′
f(t)dt = 1− p′. (15)
f(t) =
(1− p0(t))µ
λ
− β2µ
(α + β2)λ
, t′ ≤ t ≤ (T ′e2 ∧ T2). (16)
The initial conditions at time t′ are
pk(t
′) =
∞∑
n=k
e−λp(λp)n
n!
e−µ(t
′+T1)(µ(t′ + T1)
n−k)
(n− k!) , k ≥ 1. (17)
p0(t
′) = 1−
∞∑
k=1
pk(t
′). (18)
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and
f(t′) =
(1− p0(t′))µ
λ
− β2µ
(α + β2)λ
≥ 0, t′ ≤ t ≤ (T ′e2 ∧ T2). (19)
Finally, if T ′e2 < T2 then
f(T ′e2) = 0. (20)
Case 3: A mixed equilibrium strategy without atoms, and with a discontinuity
point at time 0. This will be formed if one of the following occurs:
i. T1 > Te1 and T2 > Te2, or
ii. T ′e1 < T1 and T2 < Te2.
i is equivalent to the case in Theorem 1. ii is equivalent to the case in
Theorem 1, with two exceptions. The first one is the support of f(t), which is
now along (−T ′e1 , T2]. The second is that condition (10) is no longer satisfied.
Proof. Case 1: The condition g1(t
∗, 1) > g2(1) implies that the cost asso-
ciated with the best response to every other player arriving at time −T1
is worse than just arriving at −T1. T2 < T ′, under the assumption that
g1(t
∗, 1) < g2(1), implies that all arrival times that have lower overall cost
than arriving with everyone else at time −T1 are no longer possible within
the system constraints.
Case 2: Since T2 > T
′ and g1(t
∗, 1) < g2(1), there is no pure equilibrium. In
addition, a density that starts at time −T1 cannot be part of the equilibrium.
The reason for that is as follows. If there were a density starting a time −T1
at equilibrium, then a customer who arrives at time −T1 suffers only the
earliness cost, and hence his total cost is βT1. As, under mixed equilibrium,
the customers are indifferent about when to arrive, this is the total cost of
everyone else. It is equivalent to either T ′e1 = T1 (under condition i) or to
Te1 = T1 (under condition ii). Note that neither of the latter two conditions
is the case. In addition, once an atom is created at −T1, arriving a moment
later is strictly suboptimal and hence a gap in the interval [−T1, t′] is created.
Eq. (14) is obeyed, due to the fact that the expected total cost is constant
along the support. Eqs. (15) and (16) are obeyed by the same consideration
of Eqs. (3) and (7). Eqs. (17) and (18) follow from simple probability consid-
erations. Eq. (19) implies that customers are starting to arrive for the first
time after time −T1 at t′, which is clearly the case. Finally, we assert that
Eq. (20) holds, by using the same argument starting from (10).
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Case 3: Condition i is equivalent to Theorem 1, since the opening and clos-
ing time constraints are not effective. Condition ii suggests that only the
closing time constraint is effective. This means that no atoms can be formed
as argued above in subsection 4.1.
We next provide the steps needed for numerical computation of the mixed
equilibrium in the constrained stochastic model.
Remark 5.1. If the equilibrium arrival strategy is mixed with an atom, we
make a guess for p′, then compute t′ such that g1(t
′, p′) = g2(p
′), where
g1(t, p) =


−β1t + αE
([
Np∑
j=1
Xj−T1−t
]+)
+ β2E
([
Np∑
j=1
Xj − T1
]+)
, t < 0,
β2t+ (α + β2)E
([
Np∑
j=1
Xj − T1 − t
]+)
, t > 0.
g2(p) = β1T1 + α
λp
2µ
+ β2

 ∞∑
i=1
e−λp(λp)i
i!
i∑
k=1
1
i
E

( k∑
j=1
Xj − T1
)+

 .
Given t′, we compute the initial conditions by (17) and (18). After obtaining
t′ and the initial conditions at time t′, we use a similar procedure to the one
described in Remark 4.1. We first compute T ′e2 and ignore for the time being
the fact that it may be larger than T2. This is done by computing f(t) and
pk(t) for any k ∈ {0, 1, ..., Nmax} from t′ until one of the conditions (15)
or (20) is met. The probabilities p0(t), p1(t), ..., pNmax(t) are computed using
p′0(t) = p1(t)µ− p0(t)λf(t), t′ ≤ t ≤ (T ′e2 ∧ T2). (21)
p′k(t)=−pk(t)(µ+λf(t))+pk−1(t)λf(t)+pk+1(t)µ, t′ ≤ t ≤ (T ′e2 ∧ T2).
(22)
If the stopping criterion was due to condition (15), then we guess a smaller
value of p′; otherwise we guess a larger one. This goes on until condi-
tions (15) and (20) are met simultaneously. After obtaining T ′e2, we can
check if T ′e2 < T2 or not. If T
′
e2
< T2, then we finished. If T
′
e2
> T2, we
again make a guess for p′, although now we compute f(t) until time T2, and
22
we repeat this until condition (15) is met at T2. Finally, if the equilibrium
arrival strategy is mixed without atoms, we repeat the same procedure as in
Remark 4.1, with Te2 replaced by a fixed T2. As in the previous section, this
is achieved by allowing an error of ǫ < 10−2 (see Figs 2 and 3).
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Figure 2: Numerical example: the equilibrium arrival distribution in the
constrained model for different values of T1. The equilibrium arrival strategy
under the green graph, has an atom at t = −14 of size p = 0.86. The gap is
until t = −4.15. Arrival in the interval [−4.15, 0) comes with an earliness cost
(among possible waiting and tardiness), but by arriving within the interval
[0, 33.2], one avoids cost. In the blue, red and black graphs, earliness cost
are only for those who arrived in the atom at −T1, whereas, after the gap,
customers arrive after t = 0.
5.2 Fluid model
As in the previous section, the total amount of time the server is needed in the
fluid model is Λ
µ
. Under the opening and closing time constraints, the total
amount of time during which customers are allowed to arrive is T1+ T2. If it
is larger than the total time needed, i.e., Λ
µ
< T1+T2, then at most one of the
two constraints is tight. Specifically, if T1 < Te1 then customers are starting
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Figure 3: Numerical example: the equilibrium arrival distribution in the
constrained model for different values of µ. The three grpahs illustrates all
types of possible equilibria. For example, in the lowest graph (i.e. µ = 0.15),
there is an atom at −14 of size p = 0.65 and p = 0.32 under the stochastic
and fluidic model, respectively. Under the stochatic model (the green graph),
there are two different probability densities (arriving prior and after 0) for
those who arrive after the atom. Under the fluidic model, there are three
different probability densities: (1) [−11.5,−10.1], customers have earliness
and waiting costs. (2) (−10.1, 0], customers have all cost types. (3) (0, 36.9],
customers have waiting and tardiness costs.
to arrive from time −T1 until some t < T2 (possibly pure at time −T1). If
T2 < Te2 then customers are starting to arrive from some t > −T1 until time
T2. We deal with both cases separately in Theorems 5 and 7, respectively.
Of course, if both T1 < Te1 and T2 < Te2, then the situation coincides with
our results from Theorem 2. However, if the total amount of time customers
are allowed to arrive is smaller than the total time needed to serve them (i.e.,
T1+T2 <
Λ
µ
) then things are more involved. This is because both the opening
and closing times of the system need to be considered while obtaining the
equilibrium arrival strategy. We deal with this case in Theorem 9. For each
one of the cases above we specify the corresponding socially optimal strategy.
Before presenting the equilibrium arrival strategy, we define several points
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in time and probabilities that play a role in the specific structure of the
equilibrium.
A1 =
(−β1+
√
β21 − αβ2+β22)Λ
β2µ
,A2 =
−β1β2Λ + β2Λ
√
(α+β1)2+αβ2+β22
(α2+β22+α(2β1+β2))µ
,
A3 =
2β2Λ
(α + 2β1 + 2β2)µ
, A4 =
β2Λ
(β1 + β2)µ
,
p1 =
β2Λ
2 − T1β1µ+ 12
√
−4T 21 β2(α + β2)Λ2µ2 + (2β2Λ2 − 2T1β1Λµ)2
(α + β2)Λ2
p2 =
2(β2Λ− T1µ(β1 + β2))
αΛ
,
t1 =
−T1(α + β1)Λµ+
√
Λ2(β2Λ2 − 2T1β1β2Λµ+ T 21 (β21 − β2(α + β2))µ2)
αΛµ
,
t2 = −T1 +
√
Λ2(β22Λ
2 − 2T1β1β2Λµ+ T 21 (β21 − β2(α + β2))µ2)
(α+ β1)Λµ
,
t3 =
β2Λ− T1(α+ 2β1 + β2)µ
(α + β1)µ
, t4 =
β2(T1µ− Λ)
(α+ β1)µ
.
Theorem 5. The equilibrium arrival strategy when T1+T2 ≥ Λµ and T1 < Te1
is as follows.
Case 1: If T1 ≤ A1 then a pure equilibrium will be formed at time −T1. The
corresponding social cost is Λ(β1T1 +
αΛ
2µ
+ β2
µ(Λ
µ
−T1)2
2Λ
).
Case 2: If A1 < T1 ≤ A2 the equilibrium arrival strategy incorporates an
atom with size p1 at time −T1, followed by a gap until time t1 > 0. Then
there is a positive density of α
α+β2
µ
Λ
along [t1,
Λ
µ
− T1]. The corresponding
social cost is Λβ2(
Λ
µ
− T1).
The social costs in cases 3 and 4 are identical to this case.
Case 3: If A2 < T1 ≤ A3 the arrival strategy incorporates an atom with size
p1 (the same size as the previous case) at time −T1, followed by a gap until
time t2 < 0. Then there is a positive density of
α+β1
α+β2
µ
Λ
along [t2, 0] and then
a positive density of α
α+β2
µ
Λ
along [0, Λ
µ
− T1].
Case 4: If A3 < T1 ≤ A4 the arrival strategy incorporates an atom with size
p2 at time −T1, followed by a gap until time t3 < 0. Then there is a positive
density of α+β1
α
µ
Λ
along [t3, t4], and then a density of
α+β1
α+β2
µ
Λ
along [t4, 0] and
a positive density of α
α+β2
µ
Λ
along [0, Λ
µ
− T1].
Proof. Case 1: T1 ≤ A1 implies that arriving at time −T1 with everyone else
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is the best response, and hence the equilibrium is pure. The expected disu-
tility of arriving with everyone else at time −T1 is β1T1 + αΛ2µ + β2
µ(Λ
µ
−T1)2
2Λ
,
while the best response against that is arriving at t = Λ
µ
− T1, where the
expected disutility is β2(
Λ
µ
−T1). In fact, A1 is the threshold such that lower
values of T1 make the expected disutility of arriving with everyone else at
time −T1 smaller. The social cost is just the product of the total volume Λ
and the expected disutility of each drop.
In the next three cases the equilibrium is mixed with an atom at −T1.
The atom is always followed by a gap and then by one, two or three different
constant positive densities. The values of the densities are obtained similarly
to Theorem 2, with only their boundaries changing. We further conclude
that an atom of size p = 1 cannot be formed in any of the cases 2, 3, and
4 due to the following: From case 1, when T1 ≤ A1, the atom has the size
of 1. In order to rule out the possibility a pure strategy in the other cases,
we show that from t = −A1, the atom (i.e. p1 or p2) is decreasing with T1.
That is, from the first moment that T1 > A1 the atom is smaller than 1. In
the expression that computes the value of p1, T1 appears three times. The
first two comes with a negative parameter. The third appears in the expres-
sion: (2β2Λ
2 − 2T1β1Λµ)2, we show that the difference (inside the square) is
positive and hence p1 decreases when T1 increases. Since T1 is an effective
constraint, T1 <
β2Λ
(β1+β2)µ
and as a consequence, after some simple algebra,
(2β2Λ
2 − 2T1β1Λµ) > 0. We follow the same line of analysis to show that
p2 < 1.
Case 2: T1 > A1 implies that a pure strategy is no longer possible, which
is a direct result from the previous case. T1 < A2 is equivalent to t1 > 0
which is the case here. t1 and p1 are obtained by solving the equations:
β1T1 +
αp1Λ
2µ
+ β2
(Λp1 − T1µ)2
2µp1Λ
= β2(
p1Λ
µ
− T1) + α(p1Λ
µ
− T1 − t1),
and
p1 +
µ
Λ
α
α + β2
(
Λ
µ
− T1 − t1) = 1.
where the first equation is due to similar disutilities at −T1 and t1 (which is
of course true for any possible time in the equilibrium arrival strategy). The
second equation sums the density probability. To obtain the social cost, we
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first state that the last drop will arrive exactly at t = Λ
µ
− T1, to an empty
system. Hence its total cost is β2(
Λ
µ
− T1). Consequently, the social cost is
Λβ2(
Λ
µ
− T1). In fact, this is true for cases 3 and 4 as well. Consequently, in
all mixed equilibrium cases (i.e., 2, 3 and 4) the equilibrium social costs are
the same.
Case 3: T1 > A2 is equivalent to t2 < 0. A3 is the threshold which separates
this case from case 4, and will be discussed there. t2 and p1 form the solution
of the equations:
β1T1 +
αp1Λ
2µ
+ β2
(Λp1 − T1µ)2
2µp1Λ
= −β1t1 + α(p1Λ
µ
− T1 − t1) + β2(p1Λ
µ
− T1),
and
p1 + α
µ
Λ
α
αβ2
(
Λ
µ
− T1 − t1) + α + β1
α + β2
µ
Λ
(0− t2) = 1.
which both follow the same line of analysis as in the previous case. The social
cost was already discussed in case 2.
Case 4: T1 > A3 means that T1 is large enough that the first to arrive after
the atom will get service prior to time 0. Recall that t3 is the first time
customers arrive after the atom, and arriving after t4 means that service will
be granted after time 0. In fact, A3 is the value of T1 such that t3 = t4.
T1 < A4 implies that customers cannot arrive as they would have under
equilibrium when there are no constraints at all. Consequently, they start
arriving from the first point in time they are allowed (i.e. −Te1 = −A4).
Otherwise, is they start arriving after −A4, then clearly, one can gain by
arriving exactly at −A4. p2, t3 and t4 form the solution of the equations
β1T1 +
αp2Λ
2µ
= −β1t3 + α(p2Λ
µ
− T1 − t3),
−β1t3 + α(p2Λ
µ
− T1 − t3) = −t4(β1 + α),
and
p2 + (t4 − t3)α + β1
α
µ
Λ
+
α + β1
α + β2
µ
Λ
(0− t4) + µ
Λ
α
α + β2
(
Λ
µ
− T1) = 1.
Again, the equations arise from the same considerations as in the previous
cases. The social cost was already discussed in case 2.
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Theorem 6. If T1+T2 ≥ Λµ and T1 < Te1, then the unique socially optimal
strategy has a uniform density of µ
Λ
along [−T1, Λµ − T1], and its overall cost
is 1
2
µ(β1T
2
1 + β2(T1 − Λµ )2).
Proof. To obtain the socially optimal strategy, recall from Theorem 2, when
there were no arrival constraints, that customers’ arrival strategy starts at
t = − β2Λ
(β1+β2)µ
for both the equilibrium and the socially optimal strategies.
Clearly, now that T1 < Te1 , customers will arrive later. Of course, within
the new constraint customers will arrive as early as they can, which is time
−T1. Similar to Theorem 2, customers will arrive at a rate µ in order to
avoid waiting cost, with any other rate being suboptimal. After deriving the
social optimal strategy, the overall social cost can be computed accordingly.
Whereas, it is obtained by,
−
∫ 0
−T1
β1µtdt+
∫ Λ
µ
−T1
0
β2µtdt.
Remark 5.2. The PoA in case 1 equals αΛ
2+2T1β1Λµ+β2(Λ−T1µ)2
T 21 β1µ
2+β2(Λ−T1µ)2
. The PoA in
cases 2, 3 and 4 equals 2β2Λ(Λ−T1µ)
T 21 β1µ
2+β2(Λ−T1µ)2
. One can see that α has no impact
on the PoA in these cases. This is a surprising result, because drops under
equilibrium pay a waiting cost.
We next deal with the case where only the closing time affects customers’
strategy.
Theorem 7. If T1 + T2 ≥ Λµ and T2 < Te2, then the equilibrium arrival
strategy is
f(t) =


α+β1
α
µ
Λ
, − (α+β2)Λ−T2αµ
(α+β1+β2)µ
< t < β1(−αΛ−β2Λ+T2αµ)
(α+β1)(α+β1+β2)µ
,
α+β1
α+β2
µ
Λ
, −β1(−αΛ−β2Λ+T2αµ)
(α+β1)(α+β1+β2)µ
≤ t ≤ 0,
α
α+β2
µ
Λ
, 0 ≤ t ≤ T2.
Under equilibrium, the social cost is Λβ1
(α+β2)Λ−T2αµ
(α+β1+β2)µ
.
Proof. We follow the same line of analysis as in Theorem 2, where now Te2 is
replaced by a fixed value of T2 in the equilibrium and socially optimal arrival
strategies, respectively.
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Theorem 8. If T1 + T2 ≥ Λµ and T2 < Te2, then the unique socially optimal
arrival strategy has a density of µ
Λ
along [−αΛ+β2Λ−T2αµ
(α+β1+β2)µ
, T2], and a mass of
Λ− (αΛ+β2Λ−T2αµ
(α+β1+β2)µ
+ T2)µ at T2. The socially optimal strategy overall cost is
β1(α + β2)Λ
2 − 2T2αβ1Λµ+ T 22α(β1 + β2)µ2
2(α + β1 + β2)µ
. (23)
Proof. Clearly, arriving at any other rate than µ is suboptimal. Moreover,
we construct the socially optimal cost function such that we allow a mass at
T2. This is because it can be less expensive for a mass to arrive at time T2,
rather than arriving earlier than everyone else. Let −LB be the lower bound
of the socially optimal arrival support. The socially optimal cost function is∫ 0
−LB
−β1tµdt+
∫ T2
0
β2tµdt+(Λ−(LB+T2)µ)(Λ−(LB+T2)µ)
2µ
(α+β2). (24)
Finally, LB is the value that minimizes (24).
Remark 5.3. The PoA is 2β1Λ((α+β2)Λ−T2αµ)
β1(α+β2)Λ2−2T2αβ1Λµ+T 22 α(β1+β2)µ
2 . We observe that
if T2 = 0, the PoA equals exactly 2.
We next address the case where (T1+T2) <
Λ
µ
. Different shapes of equilibrium
arrival strategies are formed by different set of values of (T1, T2). Similarly
to Theorem 5, we split these into 4 cases for different set of values of T1, only
now the thresholds that distinguish them are effected by the value of T2.
Before presenting the equilibrium arrival strategy we define several points
in time and probabilities, which play a role in the specific structure of the
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equilibrium.
A′1 =
−αΛ− β1Λ+
√
Λ
√
((α + β1)2 + αβ2 + β
2
2)Λ− 2T2β2αµ
β2µ
,
A′2 =
−β1β2Λ− α(β1 + β2)Λ + T2αβ1µ+ α2(T2µ− Λ)
β2(α + β2)µ
+√
((α + β2)2 + αβ2 + β
2
2)((α + β2)Λ− T2αµ)2
β2(α + β2)µ
,
A′3 =
2(α + β2)Λ− 2T2αµ
(3α+ 2(β1 + β2))µ
, A4 =
Λ
µ
− T2,
p′1 =
(α+β2)Λ
2−(T2α+T1(α+β1))Λµ
(α+β2)Λ2
+√
Λ2(−T 21 β2(α+β2)µ2+((α+β2)Λ−(T2α+T1(α+β1))µ)2)
(α+β2)Λ2
,
p′2 =
2(α + β2)Λ− 2(T2α + T1(α+ β1 + β2))µ
αΛ
,
t′1=
−T1(α+β1)Λµ+
√
Λ2(−T 21 β2(α+β2)µ2+((α+β2)Λ−(T2α+T1(α+β1))µ)2
αΛµ
,
t′2 = −T1+
√
Λ2(−T 21 β2((α+β2)µ2+((α+β2)Λ)−(T2α+T1(α+β1))µ)2)
(α+β1)Λµ
,
t′3 =
Λ(α+ β2)− (T2α + T1(2(α + β1) + β2))µ
(α+ β1)µ
,
t′4 =
−(α + β2)Λ + (T2α+ T1(α + β2))µ
(α + β1)µ
.
Theorem 9. If T1 + T2 <
Λ
µ
, the equilibrium arrival strategy is as follows.
Case 1: If T1 ≤ A′1 then a pure equilibrium is formed at time −T1. The
corresponding social cost is
Λ
(
β1T1 +
αΛ
2µ
+ β2
µ(Λ
µ
− T1)2
2Λ
)
. (25)
Case 2: If A′1 < T1 ≤ A′2 the arrival strategy incorporates an atom with size
p′1 at time −T1, followed by a gap until time t′1 > 0. Then there is a density
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of α
α+β2
µ
Λ
along [t′1, T2]. The corresponding social cost is
Λ
(
T2β2 + (α + β2)
(
Λ
µ
− (T1 + T2)
))
. (26)
In the next two cases the social cost is the same.
Case 3: If A′2 < T1 ≤ A′3 then the arrival strategy incorporates an atom of
size p′1 (the same size as the previous case) at time −T1, followed by a gap
until time t′2 < 0. Then there is a positive density of
α+β1
α+β2
µ
Λ
along [t′2, 0], and
finally a positive density of α
α+β2
µ
Λ
along [0, T2].
Case 4: If A′3 < T1 ≤ A′4 then the arrival strategy incorporates an atom with
size p′2 at time −T1, followed by a gap until time t′3 < 0. Then there is a
positive density of α+β1
α
µ
Λ
along [t′3, t
′
4], then a density of
α+β1
α+β2
µ
Λ
along [t′4, 0],
followed by another density of α
α+β2
µ
Λ
along [0, T2].
Proof. We follow the same line of analysis as for Theorem 5, where now Λ
µ
−T1
is replaced by a fixed value of T2 regarding the equilibrium strategy and its
social cost.
Theorem 10. One of the following exhaustive and mutually exclusive cases
occurs.
Case i: If T1 ≤ αΛ+β2Λ−T2αµ(α+β1+β2)µ , then the unique socially optimal strategy has a
uniform density of µ
Λ
along [−T1, T2] and then a mass of Λ − µ(T2 + T1) at
time T2. The overall cost of the socially optimal strategy is
1
2
(T 21 β1µ+T
2
2 β2µ+2β2(Λ−(T1 + T2)µ) +
(α + β2)(Λ− (T1 + T2)µ)2
µ
). (27)
Case ii: If T1 >
αΛ+β2Λ−T2αµ
(α+β1+β2)µ
, then the unique socially optimal strategy coin-
cides with the one presented in Theorem 8.
Proof. Case i : The socially optimal strategy is as follows: those who arrive
during the interval [−T1, T2] do not pay a waiting cost at all, while those
who arrive prior to time 0 pay an earliness cost, and those who arrive after
time 0 pay a tardiness cost. Within this group, for which the total mass is
(T2+T1)µ, the overall earliness cost is
1
2
T 21 β1µ and the overall tardiness cost is
1
2
T 22 β2µ. There is a mass of Λ−(T2+T1)µ which arrives at time T2. Each drop
immediately pays β2T2. Moreover, on average each one waits
Λ
µ
−(T1+T2)
2
time
units, which includes both waiting and tardiness costs. Therefore, the total
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contribution to the overall cost is
((
Λ
µ
−(T1+T2)
2
)
+ β2T2
)
(Λ− (T1 + T2)µ).
Case ii : According to Theorem 8, T1 >
αΛ+β2Λ−T2αµ
(α+β1+β2)µ
implies that the lower
bound constraint of the arrival is not effective under the socially optimal
strategy. Therefore, it coincide with Theorem 8.
Remark 5.4. Recall from Theorem 9 that there are two different expressions
for the equilibrium social welfare, for case 1 and cases 2, 3 and 4. Moreover,
there are two different socially optimal welfare expressions, as shown in The-
orem 10. This means that there are 4 different expressions for the PoA when
T1+T2 <
Λ
µ
. All four PoA values are obtained by dividing Eqs. (25) and (26)
by Eqs. (23) and (27).
6 Conclusions
We have studied the behavior of strategic customers who decide when to
arrive to a queue. Each one wishes to minimize his earliness, tardiness and
waiting costs. The contribution of this study is due to the additional earli-
ness cost to the arrival dilemma. As discussed in the introduction, we believe
it is vital to consider this cost when deciding when to arrive. This is because,
in many cases, this reflects much better the situation the customers are fac-
ing. The results showed that under the assumption that customers are not
constrained in their arrival times, the symmetric equilibrium is unique and
mixed. The equilibrium behavior for arriving after time 0 is similar to pre-
vious studies in which earliness cost was not included (see [4]). However,
the behavior prior to time 0 is quite unusual. If we focus on f(t) for both
t < 0 and t > 0 we observe a big difference and it is that, beside the model
parameters, for t > 0, f(t) is affected only by p0(t), but for t < 0 it is affected
by all pk(t) for k ∈ {0, 1, 2, ...}. Moreover, it is also different from the early
birds arrival distribution from [4], [20] and [12], in which it was uniform. This
is a direct result of the cost function for t < 0. Specifically, the expression
regarding the expected tardiness time. Now, customers are affected not only
by the expected waiting time, but also by the probability of being late. It
is also interesting that, f(t) can have both minimum and maximum points
in the interval of [−Te1 , 0], as it is shown in the numerical examples. This
indicates how different f(t) is compared to previous studies, in which it was
either monotone or unimodal.
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We discussed the impact of arrival time constraints. By imposing pre-
determined opening and closing times, the resulting equilibrium strategy can
be either pure, mixed with an atom, or mixed without atoms. We note that
only when the opening time constraint is effective, there can be an atom.
Further more, the two constraints are not independent and this could have a
major consequence on the equilibrium behavior. For example, by constrain-
ing the closing time, this potentially could change an opening time constraint
from being ineffective to be effective.
Guidelines for a numerical procedure to compute the equilibrium strategy
with some examples were given, in both the constrained and unconstrained
models. Beside the results in the stochastic model, we also derived the equi-
librium behavior in the fluid model, where, now it is possible to get analytic
results as opposed to the stochastic model. This allows us to obtain the
socially optimal arrival strategy, and consequently the price of anarchy. Al-
though, we are unable to connect the fluid model to the stochastic model, we
observe that in all the numerical examples the value of Te1 is always larger
in the stochastic model. That is, customers are inclined to start arriving
earlier. We believe that this is due to the uncertainty of the queue length in
the stochastic model. More specifically, due to the variance of the workload,
if one decides to arrive prior to time 0 then there is a positive probability
he will pay tardiness cost. This is not the case in the fluid model, where
one knows exactly if he pays tardiness cost or not. This uncertainty, will
eventually leads customers to start arriving earlier. This is helpful, as it may
used as a lower bound of the arrival point. Moreover, this is also true for the
atom size p, in a constrained model. That is, more customers will arrive at
the atom in the stochastic model from the same reasons.
We next discuss two limitations of our model. The first limitation is
that we assumed linear costs. Of course, non-linear costs are much more
realistic. However, considering non-linear cost functions complicates things
significantly and the type of the equations may alter the result completely.
For future study, we suggest considering perhaps some form of convex cost
function, where it describes better real life situation. As mentioned, non-liner
costs were considered in [1]. The second limitation is that the customers are
homogenous with respect to their cost function. However, heterogeneous
customers is clearly more realistic. We note that considering heterogeneous
customers can be done only by using the fluid model and otherwise is too
complicated. It has been done in [13] and [15], where both waiting and tardi-
ness costs were considered under a fluidic model. It would be interesting, for
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future study to consider heterogeneous users as well. Another issue we have
yet to attend to is the existence of an asymmetric equilibria. In [14], where
both waiting and tardiness were considered, they first proved that there is a
unique Nash equilibrium (not necessarily symmetric at this point), and then
they proved that it is symmetric. By this, they ruled out asymmetric Nash
equilibria. We believe that this is the case in our model as well, due to the
similarity of our models and [14]. Whereas, our model is an extension of the
one in [14].
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